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Abstract: Angel investors invest billions of dollars in thousands of entrepreneurial projects annually, far 
more than the number of firms that obtain venture capital. Previous research has calculated realized 
internal rates of return on angel investments, but empirical estimates of expected returns have not yet 
been produced. Although calculations of realized returns are a valuable contribution, expected returns, 
rather than realized returns, drive investment decisions. We use a new data set and statistical framework 
to produce the first empirical estimates of expected returns on angel investments. We also allow for the 
time value of money, which previous research has typically ignored. Our sample of 588 investments spans 
the 1972–2007 period and contains 419 exited investments. We conduct extensive tests to explore 
potential bias in the data set and conclude that the evidence in favor of bias is tenuous at best. Our results 
suggest that angel investors in groups can expect to earn returns that are on the order of returns on 
venture capital investments. Estimated net returns are about 70 percent in excess of the riskless rate per 
year for an average holding period of 3.67 years. This estimate is reasonable compared to Cochrane’s 
(2005) estimate of 59 percent per year for venture capital investments, which tend to be in lower-variance, 
later-stage projects. Returns have a large variance and are heavily skewed, with many losses and 
occasional extraordinarily high returns. 
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An angel investor can be defined as a person who provides funds to a private business 
which does not have publicly traded stock and is owned and is operated by people who are not 
relatives or friends of the investor. Acting as informal venture capitalists, angels invest billions 
of dollars in thousands of fledgling companies annually. What returns can these angels expect to 
receive on their investments? Although previous work has explored realized returns, this paper is 
the first to obtain estimates of expected returns on angel investments in a form comparable to 
reported expected returns on stock or venture capital. 
Until recently, research on the returns to investments by angel investors and angel groups 
has been limited because suitably large data sets simply have not been available. For example, 
Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch and Triantis (2009) have just 32 angel-only investments in their study 
of private equity, and not all of them are exited investments. The Angel Investor Performance 
Project recently has produced an informative database on angel investments. In contrast to 
Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch and Triantis (2009), these data have 588 investments of which 419 are 
exited investments. 
We use these data to explore the expected returns on angel investments. Our paper is 
similar in spirit to Cochrane (2005), who estimates the returns on venture capital investments, 
and to Barnhart and Dwyer (2009), who estimate the returns on traded stock in new industries. It 
differs from Wiltbank (2005) and Wiltbank et al. (2008) because we estimate expected returns 
rather than realized returns. Thus, our paper combines these strands of the literature by 
estimating expected returns on angel investments. The distinction between realized internal rates 2 
 
of return and expected returns is critical. Realized internal rates of return do not drive financial 
decisions. Expected returns drive financial decisions. 
II. Prior Literature 
Angel investors and their investments are not well documented. This is partly because 
individual investments tend to be informal, so there is little or no documentation or data. Also, 
practitioners and academics have not reached a consensus concerning even the definition of an 
angel investor. Shane (2008, 2009) provides a wealth of institutional details along with a good 
review of angel investors and their investments. Shane shows how the lack of consensus leads to 
divergent conclusions about the size and nature of the angel market. Our definition is: An angel 
investor is a person who provides funds to a private business which does not have publicly traded 
stock and is owned and is operated by people who are not relatives or friends of the investor. 
This definition is the same as Shane’s (2009, p. 14) except that it explicitly limits angel investors 
to investors in firms that do not have publicly traded stock.
1 
Wiltbank et al. (2008) report that angel investors invest their capital directly in early-
stage ventures, in many more businesses than do formal venture capital firms and usually in 
much smaller dollar amounts. They also note that angel investors are often the first outsiders to 
supply equity capital to entrepreneurs trying to build a business, even before formal venture 
capital is obtained. Formal venture capitalists invested less than two percent of the total capital in 
seed-stage companies during the last ten years. 
Wiltbank and Boeker (2007a) also report an important trend: individual investors 
increasingly are forming angel investor groups. Wiltbank and Boeker list several advantages to 
group membership and investment including shared expertise and diversification. According to 
                                                           
1 Otherwise Warren Buffett would be an angel investor in Goldman Sachs, which is not the sort of investment 
generally considered to be an angel investment. We thank Stephen Miller for noting this.  3 
 
the Angel Capital Education Foundation, about 10,000 accredited angel investors belonged to 
265 angel groups as of 2007. 
Shane (2005) reports information gleaned from four focus groups of angel investors. 
These angel investors are diverse in their backgrounds, their motivations for investing and in 
their investment approaches. Not surprisingly, their investments also are diverse. 
Mason and Harrison (2002) and Wiltbank (2005) are among the first to explore the 
returns on angel investments. Mason and Harrison’s data are for the U.K. and Wiltbank’s data 
are for the U.S. Their results are broadly consistent: returns less than the investment predominate 
with a few spectacular returns of 100 percent net of investment or even much more. Compared to 
U.K. returns, U.S. returns are more extreme with more returns less than the investment and more 
net returns above 100 percent. 
Much of the research on angel investors examines management strategies. For example, 
Wiltbank et al. (2008) examine 121 angel investors who made 1,038 new venture investments. 
They distinguish between prediction and control strategies. Investors who use prediction 
strategies attempt to predict events and position themselves to capitalize on them. In contrast, 
investors who use control strategies focus on the subset of events that they believe they can 
control and optimize accordingly. Sarasvathy (2001) suggests that investors have no reason to 
predict events to the extent that they can control them. Wiltbank et al. (2008) report that angels 
who use prediction strategies tend to make significantly larger venture investments. Angels who 
use control strategies have fewer failures. 
Goldfarb et al. (2009) study data from the failed law firm of Brobeck, Phleger & 
Harrison. The data contain 182 deals involving a first issue of equity made from 1993 to 2002. 
Of the 182 deals, there are just 32 angel-only deals. Goldfarb et al. report four main results. First, 4 
 
if the capital requirements are small, then the deal can be angel-only, venture capital-only, or 
mixed.  Larger deals include venture capital participation. Second, in first-round financing, 
called Series A deals, angels almost always take preferred shares. In these data, deals with angel 
investors have weaker control rights even after controlling for size, age and other variables that 
might affect risk preferences. Third, among smaller deals, angel-only deals fail the least often. 
This could be due to what Goldfarb et al. call “inactive” firms, firms that have not officially 
failed but which have no positive value. Fourth, large deals with only venture capital tend to be 
more successful than large mixed deals. Goldfarb et al. speculate that some deals require a 
sufficiently large amount of funds that venture capital cannot be excluded even if such funding 
seemingly lowers the probability of success. 
Goldfarb et al.’s study requires a major qualification: They treat angel groups as venture 
capital firms. They say that there are “a small number” of such deals. They add that their results 
are robust to the classification of investor classes. Still, their conclusions may not apply to angel 
groups. 
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) study the returns on private equity investment. 
They report that private-equity returns are no larger and may very well be smaller than returns on 
public equity portfolios. This is true despite the greater concentration of risk and higher variance 
of private-equity returns. This suggests a private-equity premium puzzle with private equity 
paying too little, which is the opposite of the public-equity premium puzzle. For an investor with 
a relative risk-aversion coefficient of two, private equity held in such concentrated amounts must 
return ten percent more than public equity portfolios to offer fair compensation for the level of 
risk borne. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen report that the shortfall is about $460,000 during 
the working life of an entrepreneur. They suggest six possible reasons why entrepreneurs might 5 
 
accept this apparent reduction in their wealth. These are optimal contracting and moral hazard, 
higher risk tolerance, other pecuniary benefits, nonpecuniary benefits, skewness preference and 
over-optimism.  
Our paper is similar in spirit to Cochrane’s paper (2005), which examines the distribution 
of returns on venture capital investments from 1987 through June 2000. He finds that his sample 
of venture capital investments has expected proportional returns on the order of 59 percent per 
year. He concludes that venture capital investments and the smallest NASDAQ stocks have 
roughly similar returns and return volatilities during his sample period. Barnhart and Dwyer 
(2009) show that expected returns to investors in stocks in new industries are positive and 
approximate those of market returns. Ex post returns reflect infrequent but very large gains and 
frequent but smaller losses, and the payoffs are broadly consistent with a log-normal distribution 
of expected returns. 
III. Data 
This paper uses data from the Angel Investor Performance Project (AIPP).
2 Wiltbank and 
Boeker (2007a) report that these data contain survey responses from 86 angel groups totaling 539 
investors who had made 3097 investments. Exits had been achieved for 1137 of those 
investments. Not all of these investors provided data for the variables used in our analysis. We 
find 588 useable investments in the data. Of these, 419 have exited. Wiltbank and Boeker discuss 
non-response bias and other possible problems with survey data but provide evidence that the 
AIPP data are relatively free of such problems. They conjecture that the most likely source of 
bias is that respondents might report good investment outcomes and neglect poor outcomes. 
Although the response rate by groups is 31 percent, the average response rate of members of 
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those groups is only 13 percent. With such a low response rate, the concern is that responders 
may not be representative. For example, responders may be those with higher returns. Wiltbank 
and Boeker, however, report that the distribution of reported returns is similar for groups with 
response rates of 60 to 100 percent as for groups with a much lower response rates. If the 
distribution of returns is the same across these groups, then this provides little evidence of 
correlation of return with reporting frequency.  
The potential for sample-selection bias compared to other samples remains, though. The 
AIPP angels are not representative of angels in general because all of the AIPP angels are 
members of angel groups and are accredited investors. The restriction of any conclusions to 
angel groups when the data cover only angel groups is inevitable. In addition, AIPP investments 
are all equity, whereas Shane (2009, p.80) finds that 40 percent of the dollar value of angel 
investments is debt. Debt investments by angel investors may generate lower expected returns 
than the AIPP data represent. We attack the issue of selection bias along two lines. First, we 
compare the return multiples from the AIPP to other reported measures. For the most part, the 
AIPP numbers are similar to those reported by other researchers. Second, we compare other 
AIPP variables such as the proportion of IPOs, buyouts and failures to other datasets. We find 
only relatively small deviations between the AIPP and other reported values. 
Because these tests are lengthy, we provide details in Appendix I and a brief summary in 
the text. There is some evidence of selection bias, but the evidence is far from overwhelming. 
The most convincing evidence of bias is the high percentage of AIPP investments that result in 
an IPO, which may inflate the reported performance of the angel groups that participated in the 
AIPP.
3 However, implied internal rates of return and return multiples are comparable with 
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figures from other sources, especially on a value-weighted basis. In addition, the data survive 
several checks designed to detect bias. For example, we might expect larger deals to be less 
prone to bias because survey respondents are more likely to remember those deals correctly. We 
find, though, that multiples from deals larger than the median do not differ statistically from 
those smaller than the median. Deals with more than one angel group member might be more 
likely to be reported accurately, yet we find no evidence from the number of co-investors that the 
annual return multiple is biased upward. 
The financial variables in the AIPP are the key for our purposes. Because the AIPP 
reports information about initial investments, intermediate cash flows and exit values, we are 
able to compute both total returns and internal rates of return. From these, we can then estimate 
expected returns. 
Figure 1 diagrams cash flows between the angel investor and the entrepreneur in these 
data. Flows above the horizontal time line are cash flows from the entrepreneur to the angel 
investor. Flows below the line are cash flows from the angel investor to the entrepreneur. 
Investments in the project made after the initial investment are called follow-on investments. The 
AIPP calls the first of these follow1invest and the second follow2invest. In both cases the data 
contain the dollar amount and date of these investments. The AIPP sums any subsequent 
investments and reports the total as followxinvest. For these, the dollar amount is available but 
not the year of the investment. These three cash flows are reported 117, 24 and eight times, 
respectively. For exited projects, these cash flows occur 106, 19 and seven times, and all 
reported values are positive. Midcash is the total dollar amount of any cash flows from the 
project to the angel investor before the exit date. The AIPP does not report the year of these cash 
flows. Midcash is positive for 78 investments, and all of these are exited investments. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
between the exit proportions of Band of Angels and the AIPP dataset. We have no way to control for these factors. 8 
 
Most previous work on angel investments uses base multiples, defined as total cash flows 
to the investor divided by total investments. This has the advantage of simplicity but ignores the 
opportunity cost of the timing of cash flows. We use present values for all computations. We do 
this by discounting these cash flows from the year in which they occur to the year of the initial 
investment at the risk free rate. This means that all expected returns are excess returns: returns in 
excess of the risk free rate. 
Using the risk free rate may seem strange given that angel investments are risky. Our use 
of the risk-free rate does not mean that our calculations assume that the investor would invest in 
a risk-free asset if the angel investment were not available. The purpose of discounting is to 
bring all cash flows to a common date. Appendix II contains the details of the present value 
calculations. 
IV. Issues in Estimating Expected Returns 
The purpose of our paper is to estimate the expected returns on angel investments. This is not 
as simple as it might seem because the observed returns on angel investments are influenced by 
choices that investors make. What sorts of the choices are they? 
A.  The Investor’s Exit Rule 
We assume that investors maximize their expected utility of consumption, which is 
increasing in the payoff from the investment. We assume that the investment lasts a finite period. 
The investor’s choice is an application of investment theory tracing to Frank Knight and 
Irving Fisher. The expected present value of utility of the cash flows is 
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the value of the investment at t, the date when the investment begins is t=0 and T is the project’s 
termination date. The investor chooses I(t) and T to maximize this expected present value. For 
simplicity, we set I(t) to a constant I determined at the start of the project, in which case equation 
(1) is 
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Making I(t) variable would complicate the algebra without adding any insights. Maximizing 
equation (2) with respect to T implies that the partial derivative is set to zero, which implies after 
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This states that the expected increase in the utility of the value of the project relative to 
the expected utility of the value of the project equals the discount rate at the end of the project. If 
the utility of the value of the investment is increasing at a decreasing rate 
( () ()
2 2 /0 duST d ST < ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ) and the value of the investment as a function of time is decreasing at 
a decreasing rate ( ( )/0 dS T dT < ), then this solution for the stopping time is a maximum. 
Researchers commonly suppose that marginal utility is decreasing in wealth. Even so, it is 
possible and even plausible that the value of the investment increases at an increasing rate before 
it starts to increase at a decreasing rate, which could result in the expected increase in marginal 
utility increasing for a time before it decreases. 
Discounting the future value S(T) does not change the basic message. With the value S(T) 10 
 
discounted at the risk-free rate r with  ( ) ( )
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Although more complex than Equation (3), this represents exactly the same condition evaluated 
at T. 
The choice to exit with zero payoff is not necessarily included in this characterization of 
the optimal exit time. That choice also will be made if it maximizes expected utility.   Exiting the 
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which includes the prior solution for a positive ending value as a special case. 
  The overall implication is that the exit decision is exogenous. The entrepreneur maintains 
his investment in the project until it no longer earns the opportunity cost of the investment. 
Although the form of the exit may vary, the timing of the exit is exogenous.   
B.  Computing Expected Returns 
Though the computation of internal rates of return from actual investments is 
straightforward, the calculations are more subtle and complex in the context of expected returns 
with different project lives. Average internal rates of return per year are average returns per 
project lasting T years. This is given by  [ ] EE ( 1 ) / ( ) 1 . RS tS t = +− For angel investments in Wiltbank 
and Boeker’s (2007b) data, average internal rates of return are on the order of 27 percent 11 
 
annually. Expected returns may well be similar to these actual returns, although this is not 
inevitable. 
A large proportion of angel investments return nothing (see DeGennaro, 2010). Standard 
Brownian motion for the value of equity is inappropriate for angel investments because the value 
of the equity can never be zero if it can be represented as a logarithm. To circumvent this 
complication we start the analysis from standard Brownian motion for the value of the firm’s 
assets A(t), rather than the equity. The firm’s assets consist of debt D and equity S. For analytical 
purposes, we assume that the firm ceases operations if the value of the firm’s assets is less than 
the value of the debt. This guarantees that the value of assets is non-negative and except for a set 
of measure zero, positive. The associated diffusion equation and conditions are 
  ()/ () () ,     () () () ,     () () , d At At d t d Bt At Dt St At Dt μ σ =+ = + ≥  (6) 
 
where μ is the expected return on the assets, σ is the underlying return volatility and B(t) is a 
standard Wiener process. Ito’s lemma implies that 
  ()
2 l n () 0 . 5 () ,     () () , dA t d t d B t A tD t μσ σ =− + ≥  (7) 
 
This can be written in terms of the ratio of the value of equity to debt, f,  
  () ( )
2 l n ()1 0 . 5 () ,     () () , d S t f dt dB t A t D t μσ σ +=− + ≥  (8) 
 
which can be rewritten as 
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If we assume that the ratio of the value of debt to equity primarily is a drift term such as 
() ln 1 ( ) f df td t μ += and that the mean equity return is  , s f μ μμ = − then the evolution of the value 
of owner’s equity is given by 
  () 2 l n () 0 . 5 () ,     () () . s dS t d t d B t A t D t μσ σ =− + ≥  (10) 
 12 
 
These equations indicate that the expected return for firms that end with a positive value 
is  ( ) 2 exp 0.5 α σ + , where α is the log return for firms that end with positive value. If firms that 
are terminated with a value of zero have the same variance of returns as other firms but a 
different ex post realization,
4 then an estimate of the expected return is 
  ( ) 2 exp 0.5 , s p μα σ =+  (11) 
 
where p is the probability that a firm will end with a positive return. 
Maximum likelihood is a natural estimator of the expected return. Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1996), Gourieroux and Jasiak (2001), and Tsay (2002) provide the maximum 







































=Δ =∑   and  t = 1, ..., T. The index t spans all project-years, so that an 
observation is the log return for a year for a project.
5 Barnhart and Dwyer (2009) provide details. 
One benchmark for the return is the average annual return on stocks, which is consistent 
with using each year of a project as an observation. If one is interested in comparing the expected 
return in a typical angel investment for a year to stock returns, the returns should be weighted by 
the number of years that the investment is ongoing. One ten-year project earning 10 percent 
annually is equivalent to 10 one-year projects earning 10 percent. This is in contrast to 
computations by Wiltbank and Boeker (2007b), for example, who weight each investment the 
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same regardless of duration. 
V. A First Look at the Data 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the underlying data used in this paper. We use 588 
observations from the AIPP data set that report the dollar amount and year of the initial 
investment in each project. Of these 588 investments, a total of 419 are exited and 169 are not 
exited as of the end of the data in 2007. If the project is exited, then the observation contains the 
year of exit and exit cash. Investments made in the project after the initial investment are called 
follow-on investments.
6 The data contain the dollar amount and date of up to two such 
investments. The AIPP also reports the total dollar amounts of any subsequent angel investments 
but does not report the year or years of those investments. There are eight projects with more 
than two investments. We know that any additional investment occurs after the second 
investment and before the project is exited or else before the end of the dataset in 2007. The data 
also include the dollar amount of any cash flows from the project to the angel investor before the 
exit date but provide no information on the date. Such cash flows are reported 78 times. We 
know that these mid-cash payments occur between the year of the initial investment and the year 
of exit or the end of the dataset in 2007 but not the exact date.
7 
  The maximum invested in projects by a single investor never is more than $5.1 million 
and the mean is only about $147 thousand. Even this number is misleadingly large: the median 
amount invested is only about $49 thousand. These are quite small investments by venture 
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6 The AIPP calls the first of these follow-on investments follow1invest and the second follow2invest. There also is a 
followxinvest for the sum of any additional investments. 
7 Projects with follow-on investments or mid-cash flows tend to be a bit longer than those without them. Investments 
with mid-cash payment last an average of 4.7 years compared to 3.3 years for those with no mid-cash payments (t-
statistic = 3.6). Projects with one follow-on investment last 4.2 years versus 3.4 years for those without (t-statistic = 
3.1).  14 
 
capital standards. Cochrane (2005) reports an average of $6.7 million per round in his sample of 
venture capital investments. 
  The total cash received by investors from exited projects ranges from zero to $33 million 
and also is heavily skewed to the right, with a mean of $490 thousand and a median of only $42 
thousand.  Total investments and cash received take no account of the timing of the cash flows 
and neither does the base multiple commonly used by practitioners. Because of its wide use, we 
include the base multiple in Table 1 even though it takes no account of the time value of money. 
The base multiple computed as the present value of receipts relative to the present value of 
investment, or PV base multiple, shows the ratio of receipts relative to investment with both 
valued at a common date. The median PV base multiple is less than one, indicating that more 
than half the projects return less than their investment. However, the mean PV base multiple is 
7.37, well above one. The maximum PV base multiple is 1,333, which is extraordinary. 
The net returns and log returns tell a similar story of frequent low returns and infrequent 
high returns. The net return is the internal rate of return on the project, with all funds discounted 
back to the investment date at the risk-free rate. The mean net return of the 408 completed 
projects with a duration of a year or more is 29 percent, but the median is -2 percent with a range 
from 0 to 3,241 percent. The log returns, which necessarily exclude the completed projects with 
zero payoff, have a positive median which is less than the mean, but not by as large a value as 
the net returns. 
Aspects of the investments themselves are interesting. The data indicate that investors 
spend a fair amount of time on due diligence before investing. There is positive skew in these 
numbers, as there is for payoffs. The mean number of hours of due diligence is 65.4, with a 
median of only15 and a reported range from zero to 5,000 hours. Surprisingly, the data  provide 15 
 
no support for the notion that angel investors tend to invest more time on due diligence as 
investment amounts increase. The correlation of due diligence and the initial investment is only 
0.04 with a p-value of 0.68 and the correlation of due diligence and total investment it is only 
0.03 with a p-value 0.71. What does attract an angel investor’s attention is the percentage of his 
wealth that he invests in angel investments. The correlation between the amount of due diligence 
and the percentage of an angel’s wealth invested is 0.15 (p-value 0.09). Angel investors 
apparently take extra care to evaluate projects if they are likely to be disproportionately invested 
in startup and early-stage companies relative to the rest of the market portfolio. 
For projects that include stage information, almost half are startups. Seed and startup 
companies are more than three-quarters of all projects. Turn-around firms and late-stage 
companies are the smallest proportion of the investments. The data also indicate that investors 
are engaged with the firms in most instances, with over three quarters of investors interacting 
with the firm once a quarter or more and 23 percent of investors interacting with the firm weekly 
or daily. 
These data also support the conventional wisdom that members of angel investor groups 
are seasoned investors with extensive business experience. Angel investors who reported 
participating in AIPP projects have been making angel investments for an average of about 11.3 
years. This masks a broad range of experience as angels, though. The angel investors in the data 
have as few as one year’s experience to as many as 49 years’ experience as angels. They average 
16.2 angel investments each and on average have exited from about 7.1 investments. 
Angel investors clearly do not completely diversify away the firm-specific risk in these 
investments. The mean percentage of wealth invested in angel investments is 13 percent, with a 
median of 10 percent, reflecting a positive skew. The range of the percent of wealth invested is 16 
 
from one to 85 percent. Some angel investors need not be concerned with the idiosyncratic risk 
of these investments; others are not likely to ignore the idiosyncratic risk of their angel 
investments.  
These angel investors are highly educated. Almost 70 percent of those who reported their 
academic degrees have advanced degrees. Of the 132 angels who reported their academic 
degrees (not including one “Other”), 40 had bachelors degrees, 67 had masters degrees, 10 held 
law degrees and 15 had earned a Ph.D. 
How do these angel investors exit from their investments? Table 2 gives the answer. Of 
the 408 exited projects that last at least one year, 114 have the unhappy result that the firm ceases 
operation. Selling the firm is by far the most common way that angels earn a return; in 180 cases 
another company buys the firm and in an additional 20 cases other investors buy the firm. About 
a quarter as many firms – 56 in all – exited by means of an initial public offering (IPO). The 
fraction of IPOs for these exited firms lasting at least one year is about 13.5 percent, which is 
relatively high compared to other estimates of the fraction of angel investments that culminate in 
IPOs. We investigate this in the appendix.  Here, we note that 13 of these IPOs have investments 
in the same company in the same year and exits in the same year. Thirteen members of a group 
saw a deal, bought in at the same time and later reported the deal to AIPP. If this single deal had 
exited some other way, then the IPO percentage would drop to just over 10 percent of the exited 
projects and a little more than seven percent of the full sample. 
Table 2 also shows the net annual returns by type of exit. Not surprisingly, investments in 
firms that cease operating have the lowest net return. These firms lose about 93 percent of their 
value annually. Firms that have an IPO or are bought by another operating firm have the highest 
average returns, about 94 percent annually.  17 
 
Table 3 shows the net returns and log returns by industry. We aggregate the data into the 
categories listed in Table 3. Some of the “industries” listed in Table 3 such as “Business products 
and services” are in the original data and some such as “Internet” are an aggregation of various 
industries provided on the questionnaires. About half of the exited projects have industry missing 
and the industry with the highest net return is “Missing”, so not too much should be made of this 
information. Nonetheless, the distribution of investments is interesting. The largest industries in 
terms of completed projects are software, consumer products and services and business products 
and services. Business products and services is the industry with the highest mean return and IT 
services is the industry with the lowest mean return. 
Figure 2 shows the log returns for the projects by duration. The underlying data are 
investments and payoffs, which we have reduced to a common date by the risk-free rate. Figure 2 
shows the average log return in excess of the risk-free rate for each exited project by the 
durations of the projects in years. The range of the log returns decreases as the duration of 
projects increases, which suggests that the standard deviation decreases. Table 4 shows that the 
standard deviation does indeed decrease as the duration of projects increases. This is not an 
artifact of the existence of fewer projects for longer durations. The number of projects with 
positive payoffs and durations of one to five years is 58, 49, 49, 51 and 33. Actually, the decline 
in standard deviation is predictable. The annual return for T years can be interpreted as the mean 
annual return for T years. If the standard deviation of the annual return is constant each year, 
then the standard deviation of the annualized T-period return is the annual standard deviation 
divided by  T years. 
Does the standard deviation diminish in this fashion? Table 4 suggests a qualified yes. 
Table 4 shows that the one-year projects’ standard deviation is outsized relative to other years. 18 
 
The standard deviations for project longer than one year ranges from 0.11 to 0.80, which is quite 
a range but far below the standard deviation for one-year projects.  As expected, the underlying 
annual standard deviations do not tend to decline with duration. 
VI. Expected Returns 
Table 5 presents the estimates of expected return. The first estimate is for firms that last 
at least one year. Our estimate of the net return in excess of the riskless rate is 69.9 percent per 
year. This may seem extraordinarily high if compared to returns on stock that have averaged on 
the order of 11 or 12 percent per year in recent decades before the recent financial crisis. A more 
appropriate comparison, though, is Cochrane’s (2005) estimate of 59 percent for venture capital. 
Venture capitalists typically invest after angel investors, when risks tend to be lower. Expected 
returns would be correspondingly lower. 
The AIPP reports the duration of projects which last less than a year as having lasted zero 
years. The second estimated expected return in Table 5 includes these firms using an estimate of 
half of a year as the projects’ durations. As might be expected, this estimate of 71.4 percent is 
little different than the expected return based on firms that lasted a year or longer. This is 
because each observation is weighted by its duration, and six projects that last on average half a 
year can have little effect given the size of the dataset and the duration of some of the projects. 
Our model assumes that projects resulting in payoffs of zero have the same variance as 
projects that result in nonzero payoffs. How reasonable is this assumption? Two parameters 
identify a normal distribution. The mean and variance of the lognormal distribution imply a 
unique associated truncated normal distribution and we can compute the implied fraction of 
observations at the boundary of zero.
8 We use the data for projects that last a year or longer. The 
                                                           
8 Stephen Miller suggested this in a seminar at UNLV. 19 
 
lognormal distribution for project-years with a positive ending value has a mean of 0.128 and a 
variance of 1.010. The associated truncated normal distribution has a mean of 1.893 and a 
variance of 3.651. This distribution has 16.1 percent of its mass at zero. Compared to the actual 
value of project-years with zero payoffs of 10.2 percent (10.6 percent including projects that last 
less than one year), an estimate of 16.1 percent would not dramatically affect our estimate of the 
expected return from these investments. We conclude that the assumption that the variances are 
the same for projects paying zero and projects paying nonzero amounts does not distort our 
estimate. 
VII. Conclusion 
  Angel investors collectively make extremely large investments in start-up firms. In many 
cases they are the first outsiders to provide equity to new businesses. Research on angel 
investments has lagged though, because large data sets have been unavailable or proprietary. The 
Angel Investor Performance Project now offers the opportunity to conduct research that 
previously has been impossible. 
  Previous research has calculated realized internal rates of return on angel investments. 
Although this is an important contribution, internal rates of return are subject to misinterpretation 
due to nonlinearities and statistical biases. Perhaps more important though, realized internal rates 
of return do not drive financial decisions. Expected returns drive financial decisions. 
  Our results suggest that angel investors earn returns that are similar, at least in broad 
measure, to the returns on venture capital investments and on new industries. We estimate an 
expected return of about 70 percent per year in excess of the riskless rate. This compares to 
Cochrane’s (2005) estimate of 59 percent per year for venture capital.20 
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 Number  of 
observations
Mean Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
All projects            
Total investment       588  146,895  48,868  398,958  1,000  5,100,000 
PV total investment  588  144,875  47,575  389,932  1,000  5,096,457 
Years held so far  588  3.189  3  3.08  0  35 
            
Exited projects            
Total investment  419  169,089    50,000  454,515  1,000  5,100,000 
Total cash out  419  490,022  42,052  2,196,936  0  33,000,000 
Base multiple  419  11.95  1.00  87.89  0  1,332.80 
Years held  419  3.61  3  3.24  0  35 
PV total investment  419  166,407  50,000  443,895  1,000  5,096,546 
PV cash out  419  394,205  38,113  166,4952  0  21,876,92 
PV base multiple  419  7.37  0.94  41.91  0  1,332.80 
Net return  408  0.2938  -0.0176  2.2992  0  32.4112 
Log return  291  0.2474  0.2154  0.7870  -2.3223  3.5089 
            
Non-exited projects            
Total investment  169  91,869  26,000  194,588  5,000  1,692,000 
PV total investment  169  91,493  26,000  192,289  5,000  1,677,931 
Years held so far  169  2.14  1  2.34  0  13 
            
Characteristics of 
investments 
          
Diligence (hours)  232  65.18  15  346.03  0  5,000 
            
Stage of project at 








      
   Seed  80  29.09         
   Startup  124  45.09         
   Early  51  18.55         
   Late  11  4.0         
   Turn around  9  3.27         
            23 
 
 
Interaction of investor 
with firm (percent) 
      
 Number  of 
observations
Mean Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
 242  100.0%         
Daily 33  11.83         
Weekly 31  11.11         
Monthly 44  15.77         
Quarterly 71  25.45         
Annually 17  6.09         




          
Years investing  295  11.31  8  10.03  1  49 
Number of projects 
invested in 
338 16.17  9  19.49  1  63 
Number of projects 
exited from 
362 7.08  2  13.19  0  42 
Percent of wealth 
in angel 
investments 
237 13.05  10  15.22  1  85 
            
Percent with degrees            
 Bachelor’s  40  30.30         
 JD  10  7.58         
 Master’s  67  50.76         
 Ph.D.  15  11.36         
 
Total investment  Total dollar amount invested in a project. 
PV total investment  Total dollar amount invested in a project discounted at the riskless rate. 
Years Held  Years between the angel investor’s initial investment in the venture and exit from the  
 venture. 
Years held so far  Years held for exited projects; the number of years since initial investment in the 
  venture and the survey date for nonexited. 
Total cash out  Total dollar amount paid to an investor by a project. 
PV total cash out  Total dollar amount paid to an investor in a project discounted at the riskless rate. 
Base multiple   Total cash out divided by Total investment. 
PV base multiple   PV total cash out divided by PV total investment. 
Net return  (PV Base multiple)
(1/YearsHeld)-1. 
Log return  ln(PV base multiple) /YearsHeld. 
Years Invested   Years that the angel investor has been investing. 
Years Worked Large  Angel investor’s years of work experience in firms with more than 500 employees. 
Total Investments  Total number of angel investments that the respondent has made. 
Total Exits  Total number of angel investment exits that the respondent has experienced.  
Diligence  Number of hours of due diligence the angel investor group conducted prior to making the 
investment. 24 
 
This table presents summary statistics for our data for all projects, both exited and non-exited. It 
presents summary data on the stage at which investments are made, interaction of the investor 
with the firm, and selected characteristics of the investors. There are 588 observations, of which 
419 are exited. Of those 419 observations, 11 observations have durations listed in the data as 0 
years, for which net returns and log returns cannot be calculated. In addition, 117 projects have 
durations of a year or more but have payoffs of zero. For these observations, the log return 












Average Net Returns by Type of Exit 
 
Exit Type  Number  Average Net Return 
    
Ceased operating  114  -0.930 
    
Bought by another operating 
firm 
180 0.8412 
    
Bought by investors  20  0.4467 
    
Initial public offering  56  0.9434 
    
Other 9  0.0302 
    




       
Net return  (PV Base multiple)
(1/YearsHeld)-1. 
 
Seventeen projects with durations less than a year are excluded from the averages. This table shows the net return 
rather than the log return in order to include firms with payoffs of zero. The category “Missing” are firms with 






Returns by Industry 
 
Average Net Return 
 
 
Industry Number  of 
Observations 
Mean Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
All  408  0.294  -0.018 2.299  -1.000 32.411 
Biotechnology  8    -0.067        -0.506         1.131        -1.000  1.941 
Business products and services  25      1.808     -0.080         6.945             -1.000  32.411 
Communications  4     -0.326       -0.604         0.841            -1.000  0.902 
Consumer products and services  21  -0.732      -1.000      0.497              -1.000  0.306 
Electronics hardware  17        -0.107        -0.003         0.847        -1.000  1.845 
Financial services  5         0.030         0.094         0.661          -1.000  0.830 
Healthcare services  8              -0.152  -0.019         0.804        -1.000  1.242 
IT services  7      -0.452              -1.000  0.744        -1.000  0.862 
Internet  12       0.749        -1.000         0.591        -1.000  0.694 
Media and Entertainment  17     0.069        -0.096         1.495    -1.000  5.609 
Medical devices and equipment  9      -0.333         0.102         0.640         -1.000  0.265 
Software  45        -0.117        -0.820         1.499        -1.000  7.575 
Other  21         0.273         0.266         0.813        -1.000  2.824 








Observations Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
All  291  0.247         0.215         0.787        -2.322         3.509 
Biotechnology  4  0.549         0.565          0.451        -0.013         1.079 
Business products and services  13  0.916         0.428         1.149               -0.083  3.509 
Communications  3  -0.406        -0.840         0.913        -1.020         0.643 
Consumer products and services  5  0.112         0.050         0.138        -0.035         0.267 
Electronics hardware  12  0.080         0.082         0.600        -0.959         1.046 
Financial services  4  0.224         0.149         0.268        -0.006         0.604 
Healthcare services  5  0.255         0.224         0.339               -0.049  0.807 
IT services  3  0.200            -0.0004  0.370              -0.023  0.620 
Internet  2  0.400         0.400         0.180         0.273         0.527 
Media and Entertainment  14  -0.042        -0.059         0.688             -1.023  1.889 
Medical devices and equipment  5  0.181         0.217         0.064         0.098         0.235 
Software  25  0.029         0.241         1.029               -2.213  2.149 
Other  19  0.219         0.256         0.550             -1.542  1.341 
 
 
The mean returns are proportional returns in the first part of the table and log returns in the second part. Hence, there are 408 observations in the 
first part of the table and 291 observations in the second part after excluding 117 projects with returns of zero. The returns are returns per project, 
not for project-years as are the returns in Table 5. The industries are our consolidation of the “industries” provided in the survey, which included 







Standard Deviation of Log Returns by Year 
 
Duration Number  of 
observations 
Mean Median  Standard 
deviation 




             
1  58  0.929  1.338  1.156 -2.322  3.509 1.156 
2  49  -0.145 -0.035 0.799  -1.542 1.889  1.129 
3  49  0.340  0.484  0.497 -1.717  1.355 0.861 
4  51  0.177  0.215  0.275 -0.596  0.842 0.550 
5  33  -0.131 -0.285 0.319  -0.357 1.115  0.713 
6  15  0.125  0.224  0.714 -2.213  1.045 1.749 
7  13  -0.146 0.017  0.572  -2.017 0.326  1.513 
8  9  0.198  0.159  0.195 -0.130  0.475 0.552 
9  3  0.376 0.240 0.263  0.208 0.679  0.788 
10  1  0.024  0.024       
11  4  0.252 0.288 0.110  0.098 0.334  0.364 
13  1  0.090  0.090       
17  1  0.083  0.083       
25  1  -0.031  -0.031       
25  2  0.136 0.136 0.141  0.036 0.236  0.704 
33  1  0.057  0.057       
Total  291          
 
 
All 291 projects that have positive exit values are included in this table. The standard deviation cannot be estimated in the usual manner when 
there is only one observation and there is no information in the minimum and maximum. The standard deviation multiplied by the square root 


























Projects that Last 
One  Year  or  Longer  1,144 117  0.102 1.893 1.699 
All Projects  1,147 122  0.106 1.918 1.714 
The first estimate of the expected return uses all projects that last a year or longer. The second estimate includes projects coded as lasting zero 
years. We interpret zero years as a duration between zero and one year; we use one-half year as a point estimate of the projects’ durations. The 
three extra project-years are six half-year projects, of which five fail. In the estimates, each project is weighted by the number of years' duration. 
As a result, the six projects that are coded as 0 years in the data and given a duration of 0.5 years in the second line of the table add three project-
years. The expected return is  () ()
2 exp 1/2 p α σ +  where p is the fraction of project-years that resulted in a project exiting with a positive return, 

























Flows above the horizontal time line represent cash flows from the project (the entrepreneur) to 
the angel investor. Flows below the line represent cash flows from the angel investor to the 
project (the entrepreneur). The 419 exited observations in the AIPP data set contain the dollar 
amount, year of the initial investment, exit year and exit cash, if any. Investments in the project 
made after the initial investment are called follow-on investments. The AIPP calls the first of 
these  follow1invest and the second follow2invest. In both cases the data contain the dollar 
amount and date of these investments. The AIPP sums any subsequent investments and reports 
the total as followxinvest. For these the dollar amount is available but not the year of the 
investment(s). These three cash flows are reported 117, 24 and eight times, respectively, and all 
reported values are positive. For exited projects, these cash flows occur 106, 19 and seven times, 
and all reported values are positive. Midcash is the total dollar amount of any cash flows from 
the project to the angel investor before the exit date. The AIPP does not report the year of these 
cash flows. Midcash is reported 90 times, of which 78 are positive, and all are in the exited 
dataset. 
 
















Log Returns per Project by Duration 
Duration 
The log return for each project is on the vertical axis and the duration of the project on the 
horizontal axis. Dots sometimes overlap and therefore may represent more than one observation. 32 
 
Appendix I:  Are the Data Biased? 
 
  Researchers who study stock returns for publicly traded companies are fortunate in that 
returns data are plentiful. This is not so for angel investments. As is true for other private 
investments, transactions data are at best difficult to find and potentially unreliable if indeed they 
can be found. In this section we identify potential problems with the AIPP data, compare values 
for available returns and other characteristics with other data sources, and speculate on the effect 
of any biases that may be embedded in the data. 
  The first problem that users of survey data face is nonresponse bias. Not all people asked 
to complete a survey do so, and those who complete the survey may differ systematically from 
those who do not. Wiltbank and Boeker (2007a) report that the response rate of the AIPP is 
uncorrelated with the return measure, called the base multiple. This argues against the claim that 
the data are biased and that angels tend to report only good outcomes. Shane (2009), though, 
remains cautious. Referring to the AIPP, he says, "...we need to treat studies of the performance 
of angel investments with extreme caution." One reason for this is that the survey is of angel 
groups, not the universe of angel investors. Members of angel groups are not representative of 
angels in general; Shane reports that members of groups tend to be more successful than 
individual angels. In addition to selection bias, he notes that a sample of exited investments 
probably overweights established angels because younger groups tend to have fewer exits. 
  Malkiel and Saha (2005), who study hedge fund returns using the TASS database (1995-
2003), face two additional problems related to selection bias. The first is backfill bias (sometimes 
called incubation bias) and the second is survivorship bias. The idea behind backfill bias is that 
selection bias is compounded when those who report the data backfill the data on these funds that 33 
 
have done well. This is because hedge funds that have survived tend to have had good results in 
the years before the recording period, too. In the case of TASS, there is a related bias: Some 
funds may have reported data to another service previously. When those funds start reporting to 
TASS they might not report all of the data that they gave to the previous service. Malkiel and 
Saha say that the difference between backfilled returns and contemporaneous returns is over 500 
basis points, which is statistically significant. Neither of these additional sources of bias is likely 
to apply to the AIPP, though. The AIPP base multiples that we use are total returns on individual 
investments, not annual returns on funds. As such, they are not subject to backfill bias.   
  Survivorship bias arises because returns in the database for any period are those of 
surviving funds. Funds that fail do not report data. This biases reported returns up. Malkiel and 
Saha are able to obtain the previous returns from some defunct funds and find that the difference 
between surviving funds and defunct funds is over 830 basis points, which is statistically 
significant. The AIPP may well be subject to survivorship bias. If so, then the return multiples 
are probably too high. To check this, we next compare failure rates in the AIPP dataset with 
venture capital failure rates, as well as comparing AIPP return multiples and implied internal 
rates of return to those reported by other sources. 
 
How do AIPP failure rates compare to failure rates on venture capital investments? 
Our first bias check in the AIPP data set compares angel investment failure rates with 
those of venture capital. Angel investments are riskier than venture capital investments, so AIPP 
failure rates should be higher. Puri and Zarutskie (2009) use the Longitudinal Business Database, 
which tracks all U.S. employer business establishments, which they match to Venture Source and 34 
 
VentureXpert. They define failure as leaving the database without experiencing a firm sale or 
IPO. Their data begin in 1981. After five years, the failure rate of VC-financed firms is 20 
percent and after 10 years it is 28.4 percent. These data are right-censored, though. For firms that 
received venture capital financing before 1998, the figure is closer to 40 percent.
9 The annual 
failure rates at that point suggest that the total failure rate increases only slightly over the next 
few years. They also report results for a “one-to-one matched sample.” These failure rates are 
higher, 31 percent after five years and 36.4 percent after 10 years. Again, the evidence suggests 
that the cumulative failure rate increases only slightly beyond ten years. These figures are much 
lower than AIPP failure rates, especially given that the mean AIPP project lasts less than five 
years. Complete failures (returning nothing) comprise 29.6 percent of the AIPP sample and 51.8 
percent return less than the invested capital after adjusting for the time value of money (50.4 
percent without the adjustment). 
  Anecdotal evidence from practitioners also supports the conjecture that AIPP failure rates 
are higher than on venture capital. Fred Wilson, managing partner of the venture capital firm 
Union Square Ventures, provides anecdotal evidence of even lower failure rates than Puri and 
Zarutskie’s (2009) report for venture capital. Wilson (2007) defines failure as a project that 
returns less than its required investment and refers to an informal “1/3” rule: “1/3 of the 
investments will fail, 1/3 will under-perform expectations, and 1/3 will meet expectations.”  He 
also states that 20 percent failures, 45 percent under-performing, and 35 percent successes is 
closer to what a “good early stage investor’s track record” should be. These failure rates are far 
below those of angel investments in the AIPP data set. 
  Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) use the Thomson Venture Economics cash flow data set 
                                                           
9 
9 We thank Rebecca Zarutskie for this information 35 
 
and the VentureXpert data set to study private equity (not venture capital). Private equity 
investors provide these data voluntarily. The VentureXpert data have a success rate of 45 
percent. The cash flow data set has success rates of 50 percent. These cash flow figures are net of 
the S&P500 return and net of fees. Phalippou and Gottschalg conclude that the cash flow data set 
is biased high. The bias in failure rates, though, is probably only about five percentage points. 
These private equity failure rates are comparable to those in the AIPP data set. Phalippou and 
Gottschalg say that their private equity sample has poor performance relative to other assets of 
similar risk, though. If so, then the failure rates of these other asset classes are likely lower than 
our sample of (presumably riskier) angel investments. 
  In short, AIPP failures rates are higher than reported venture capital failure rates and 
much higher than anecdotal evidence of those rates. Private equity failure rates are roughly 
comparable. Based on failure rates, we conclude that there is little or no evidence of bias in the 
AIPP sample of angel investments. 
 
What do others say are the returns on angel investments? 
  Ideally, we could compare our estimates of expected returns to what other researchers 
have reported. Unfortunately, this is not possible. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to 
provide estimates of expected returns derived from reported transactions prices. The few 
available estimates of expected returns come from surveys, and most focus on investment 
multiples or internal rates of return. Still, we can compare some of those values to those from our 
data. If the AIPP data are comparable to what others report, then we can probably conclude that 
any bias is small – or at least, no worse than any bias in the other data sources. 36 
 
  We begin with base multiples and IRRs. The equally weighted average of the base 
multiples in our sample of 419 exited projects is 11.95. The average investment period is 3.62 
years. This implies an IRR of 98.4 percent for the exited projects -- again, equally weighted. 
How does this compare to what others have reported? Shane (2009, p. 193) says that, "Given the 
failure rate of angel investments, successful angels target a thirty times multiple on their invested 
capital in five years.” A multiple of 30 over a five-year period implies an IRR of 97.4 percent, 
which is remarkably close to the 98.4 percent IRR in our data. This does beg the questions of 
whether or not the survey respondents are answering a question that makes the two figures 
comparable, and whether the AIPP respondents are “successful angels” or whether they are more 
or less “successful.” There is no way to know. Another question is whether respondents who said 
they expect an implied IRR of 97.4 percent meant that they expect individual investments to earn 
an average of 97.4 percent, or whether they meant that they expect the total return on all of their 
investments to be 97.4 percent. Put differently, did they report an equally weighted average or 
did they report a value-weighted average? The close correspondence between the AIPP’s implied 
IRR of 98.4 percent and the “successful angels’” implied IRR of 97.4 percent suggests that they 
reported an equally weighted average. 
Still, computing the comparable value-weighted average from the AIPP data is 
worthwhile. The value-weighted base multiple of the full sample of 419 exited investments is 
2.90, which is a bit less than a quarter of the equally weighted average. The value-weighted 
average for the years the investments were held is 3.67 (obtained by computing the total amount 
invested in each project, dividing by the total invested in all projects, multiplying each quotient 
by the years held, then summing the 419 results). The implied IRR in this case is only 33.7 
percent, which is probably not too different from the expected returns on other risky equity 37 
 
portfolios during the sample period. This is especially true given that these 419 investments have 
all exited and probably will have done better than the nonexited investments in the AIPP, which 
would reduce the implied IRR in the full sample. Based on these calculations derived from base 
multiples, we conclude that if the AIPP data are biased at all, then the bias is likely to be small. 
  What other numbers in the AIPP dataset can we compare?  
  Preston (2007, page 92) gives IRRs and multiples for private equity. We reproduce Table 
5.1 below: 
Table 5.1, "Rates of Return for Private Equity Investments." 
      IRR (percent)     Return on Investment  Implied Holding Period 
Seed    60+/year   10x    4.9  yrs 
Start-up   50    8x    5.1 
Early  Stage     40    5x    4.8 
Second  Stage   30    4x    5.3 
Near  Exit   25/year  3x    4.9 
 
  Preston does not provide holding periods, so we have computed the implied holding 
periods from the IRRs and multiples. Caveats are in order. First, Preston’s table is for private 
equity. This would include investments by individual angel investors and venture capitalists as 
well as angel groups such as those in the AIPP. Including individual angel investors would tend 
to reduce the average returns and venture capitalists, who tend to invest in later-stage companies, 
would probably do likewise. Second, we do not know whether the figures are equally weighted 
or value-weighted. Given these caveats, how do these data compare to those from the AIPP? 
  First, we can see that the average holding periods are all longer than the AIPP data (3.62 
years in Table 1). However, the AIPP values are not necessarily comparable to Preston’s 
numbers. All of the holding periods used in the calculation of the AIPP holding period are for 
exited investments. Because most investments in the AIPP data are relatively recent, the 38 
 
nonexited investments in the sample probably will run longer. If Preston’s figures refer to 
investments over a period long enough to permit a stable proportion of investments to have 
exited, then the holding periods would indeed be higher than the AIPP figure. Our take is that 
Preston’s reported holding periods are at least roughly comparable to those in the AIPP. Second, 
the AIPP’s weighted-average IRR is about 33.7 percent, which corresponds to Preston’s figures 
for Early Stage or Second Stage investments. But Preston’s figures are for private equity. Early 
Stage or perhaps Start-up investments are a better match for AIPP data because successful angel 
groups tend to focus on start-ups and early-stage companies. The AIPP’s equally weighted 
average of 98.4 percent would correspond to Seed funding, and although this is half-again as 
large as the 60 percent minimum that Preston reports, it is probably not too far out of line given 
that she reports a lower bound and may include investments by those who tend to earn less than 
angel groups. 
  Reynolds (2007) reports the results of a survey of informal investors, which he defines as 
friends, family members and individuals in the personal social networks of the entrepreneurs. 
These informal investors report expected return multiples that vary by the size of the investment. 
His Table 8.13 gives the percentage of survey respondents who claim to expect multiples within 
selected ranges. We can gauge the mean response by multiplying the midpoint of the range by 
the percentage of respondents who select that range. For investments comparable to the median 
AIPP investment, informal investors expect a multiple of 6.94 and for the mean the figure is 
6.78. These figures are subject to limitations. First, we do not know the expected duration of the 
investments. Second, the figures might be biased low because the highest range a survey 
respondent could choose was bounded at 20. Third, there is no way of knowing whether the 
survey respondents provided an equally weighted expectation or a value-weighted expectation. 39 
 
Given these caveats, we can say that these multiples are a little lower than the equally weighted 
averages in the AIPP data and much higher than the value-weighted average. We conclude that 
Reynolds’ results do not suggest that the AIPP data are biased, or at least that they are not biased 
relative to his. This is especially persuasive given that at least most of Reynolds’ informal 
investors are not members of groups and we know that such investors tend to earn less than angel 
groups. 
  Additional information about expected returns can be gleaned from the information that 
angel groups provide to prospective entrepreneurs. For example, the website of Maine Angels, an 
angel group in Portland, ME (visited December 11, 2008), says that it typically funds between 
$100,000 and $2 million, and that, "Candidate companies should also have a high potential for 
growth and profitability, can provide at least 35% of annual return of investment within five to 
seven years and have a strategically planned and viable exit." All of the AIPP data are from a 
period before 2008, so to the extent that expectations shifted between the time of the investments 
in the AIPP projects and the end of 2008, these data may not be comparable. Still, the mean 
investment in the AIPP data is $169,089 (median $50,000), and 80 percent of the investments 
range from about $15,000 to about $300,000. Given that these figures are in nominal dollars, the 
AIPP data, being earlier, should be smaller, though not by enough to make these investment sizes 
comparable. A better explanation for the size disparity could be that the Maine Angels’ website 
may refer to the total investment by the entire group. The AIPP data are investments made by 
individual investors (though the individuals are members of a group). In short, the (individual) 
AIPP investments are smaller than the average Maine Angel group investment, and the value-
weighted AIPP investment tends to return a bit less than the lower bound of Maine Angel’s 40 
 
expected amount (33.7 percent vs. 35 percent). Based on this, there is no evidence that the 
returns on the AIPP data are biased high. 
  We can also compare the AIPP data on IPOs to those reported by other data sources. 
IPOs are the gold standard for angel investments, providing the extraordinarily high returns that 
catch the public’s eye. Band of Angels is perhaps the most famous angel group in the United 
States. According to Band of Angels’ website (visited March 1, 2009),  Band of Angels has had 
nine IPOs out of 209 investments (both exited and nonexited). This is only 4.3 percent. In 
contrast, the AIPP data have 56 IPOs out of 588 investments (419 exited plus 169 nonexited), or 
9.5 percent. On the one hand, this is twice as high, but on the other hand, it is at least within an 
order of magnitude.  
  In addition, the comparison is not quite as apt as it seems. Band of Angels’ figures are for 
the entire group, while the AIPP data are for individual members within groups. For example, 
suppose that one member of each of 10 different AIPP groups invests in each of 10 projects and 
one of these has a successful IPO. The IPO rate for the groups is 10 percent. However, if two 
members of one group invest in the successful IPO and only one in the other investments, then 
the group success rate is still 10 percent (1/10) while the AIPP success rate almost doubles to 18 
percent (2/11).  Band of Angels, which reports figures for the entire group, would report a 10 
percent success rate regardless of the number of individual angels who invest in each project. 
  This proves to be important because many angels in the AIPP data did invest in the same 
IPO.  In fact, 13 of the 56 IPO investments are the same deal. All 13 observations are from 
members in the same angel group who invested in the same company in the same initial year and 
exited in the same exit year. All earned the same base multiple. Thirteen members of a group 
saw a deal, bought in at the same time and later reported the deal to AIPP. If we suppose that this 41 
 
single deal had exited some other way then the IPO percentage drops from 9.5 percent to just 7.3 
percent.  If we treat the 13 observations as a single successful IPO (as Band of Angels would do), 
then the rate is 7.5 percent. These figures are still higher than Band of Angels IPO rate of 4.3%, 
but they are considerably closer. 
Moreover, the fraction of buyouts – probably the second most profitable type of angel 
exit – is almost exactly the same. Band of Angels has had 45 “profitable acquisitions,” or 21.5 
percent of its investments exit via buyout while the corresponding AIPP figure is 22.4 percent 
(132/588; 73 additional sales resulted in a loss). This comparison is also not quite as apt as it 
may seem, for the same reasons as for IPOs. 
  What does this tell us? It seems surprising that the investors in the AIPP would have a 
higher figure than Band of Angels, and this stands as the strongest evidence that the returns in 
the AIPP data are biased high. The comparable fraction of exits through buyouts, though, casts 
some doubt on the conclusion that the returns are biased high. 
  Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch and Triantis (2009, hereafter, Goldfarb et al.) use the records of 
a failed law firm (Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison; hereafter, Brobeck). Unfortunately, their results 
are not directly comparable to the AIPP because Goldfarb et al. include angel groups with 
venture capital firms. Goldfarb et al. say that they conduct robustness checks and their main 
results are not sensitive to the way that they classify investments as venture capital, angel, 
founder or family. Still, this means that we cannot directly compare specific figures from 
Goldfarb et al.'s angel data with the AIPP data because the AIPP is from groups and Goldfarb et 
al. bury their groups with venture deals. But neither can we compare the AIPP data with 
Goldfarb et al.’s venture capital results because those figures are dominated by venture capital 
deals. We can argue that Goldfarb et al.’s angels, who are not members of groups, should be less 42 
 
successful than the investors in the AIPP (Shane, 2009). They probably conduct less due 
diligence and have lower returns than the investments in the AIPP data. This is especially true if 
some of Brobeck’s deals are loans rather than equity, because the AIPP data are all equity deals. 
Finally, although Goldfarb et al. say that Brobeck entered deals of high quality, it took positions 
in some of these deals and in the end, Brobeck did fail. Perhaps the deals were not as high 
quality as it believed. 
  What do Goldfarb et al.’s data say? In addition to the classification issues noted above, 
comparisons are problematic because Goldfarb et al. have only 32 angel investments. Here are 
the outcomes for angel-only events from Goldfarb et al. and the corresponding figures from the 
AIPP: 
  Investment status      Goldfarb et al.              AIPP 
 IPO        3.1%  (1/32)         9.5%  (56/588) 
 Acquisition   18.8%  (6/32)     31.5%  (185/588)* 
 Failure    28.1%  (9/32)     25.3%  (149/588)** 
  Non-exited    50.0% (of which 25% are active   28.7% (169/588)  
    and  25%  are  inactive  and  very   * Including 20 cases  
    possibly  failures)    (16/32)     that were "Bought by 
Investors” would imply 
34.9%. 
** Including 73 exits at a loss 
would imply 37.8%. 
 
  The AIPP numbers do not sum to 100 percent because the AIPP data have categories 
such as "Other." We include investments with missing exit information as being failures. These 
numbers imply the following percentages for exited investments: 
 Investment  status  Goldfarb  et  al.     AIPP 
 IPO        6.2%      13.4% 
 Acquisition   37.6%      44.1%*   
 Failure    56.2%      35.5%** 
       *  48.9%  including  "Bought  by  Investors." 
                      ** 53.0 including 73 exits at a loss. 
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  Because all of the Brobeck et al. deals are from 1993-2002 we compute similar numbers 
from 1993-2002 below.   
    G o l d f a r b   e t   a l .            A I P P  
 IPO        3.1%        12.3%      (43/351) 
 Acquisition   18.8%      41.9%  (147/351)* 
 Failure    28.1%      33.0%  (116/351)** 
  Non-exited    50.0% (of which 25% are active     8.0%   (28/351) 
    and  25%  are  inactive  and very   * Including 10 cases 
    possibly  failures)    (16/32)     that were "Bought by 
Investors" would imply 
44.7%. 
** Including 58 exits at a loss 
would imply 49.6%. 
 
  As expected, the 32 angel investments from Brobeck et al. had a substantially lower 
percentage of IPOs and acquisitions. However, they also had a lower percentage of failures. The 
Brobeck data have much a lower percentage of exited projects. One interpretation of this 
comparison is that the proportion of IPOs and acquisitions in the AIPP dataset are too high. 
Another interpretation is that Goldfarb’s sample comprises only 32 deals and that the differences 
are simply due to chance. The 3.1% IPO rate represents, after all, just one deal. Still other 
interpretations are that the inferior results trace to Brobeck’s angels not being members of angel 
groups, or possibly that they took debt instead of equity, or the deals were bad and contributed to 
the firm’s failure. If any of these is true, then the superior performance of the AIPP investors is 
unsurprising. 
  We can also check whether the AIPP data are comparable to other data along dimensions 
other than returns. For example, Goldfarb et al. (2009) says that about 18.8 percent of angels in 
angel-only deals had previously invested in the same company while Mason and Harrison (1996) 
report 25 percent. The percentage of investments with follow-on funding in the AIPP, which is 44 
 
19.9 percent (117/588 deals), is comparable to these two figures. In addition, Cochran (2005) 
reports that venture capital investments that receive follow-on funding tend to have done well. If 
the AIPP data are biased, then we would expect them to have a higher proportion of follow-on 
investments. However, they do not. Unless the deals in Goldfarb et al. or Mason and Harrison are 
a biased standard, this stands as evidence that the AIPP data are relatively free of bias. 
  The number of coinvestors provides another avenue by which to gain insight. 
Investments made with a coinvestor are probably less prone to bias because the survey 
respondent is more likely to be caught reporting biased results. There is, after all, at least one 
other person who knows about the project (even if he invests different amounts or at different 
times). In our data this comparison is problematic because there are many missing values for 
coinvestors. Still, it is worth doing. We find that t-tests show that the base multiple is 
significantly different between investments with coinvestors and those without (t-ratio = 2.76), 
and the point estimate suggests that base multiples are higher for deals without coinvestors. This 
is indeed what we would expect if the data are biased. For annual multiples, though, the t-ratio 
falls to 1.40. Regression analysis tells the same story. When we regress the base multiple on the 
number of coinvestors, we obtain a significantly negative coefficient (-0.82, t-ratio = -1.98). This 
is consistent with selection bias in the data, which is being mitigated on deals with many 
coinvestors because the survey respondents are more likely to be caught reporting false data. Yet 
this evidence of bias also vanishes with annual multiples; the estimated coefficient of -0.70 is not 
close to being statistically significant (t-ratio = -0.94). This suggests that the regression is simply 
measuring the relation between the number of coinvestors and the duration of projects rather than 
the relation between the number of coinvestors and the total return multiple. Deals with more 
coinvestors do, in fact, tend to be shorter. The correlation coefficient between the number of 45 
 
coinvestors and project duration is -0.24 with a p-value of 0.004. 
  We also have deal size. It seems reasonable that larger deals are more likely to be 
remembered correctly. This alone would not eliminate intentional bias, but it would tend to 
eliminate unconscious bias. People may still lie, but they are less likely to remember only the 
good deals if the deals are large. Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch and Triantis (2009) suggest that more 
sophisticated investors are more likely to do larger deals, too. Arguably, these sophisticated 
investors are less biased, or perhaps more likely to fear posting inflated results on the AIPP 
surveys but smaller figures on, say, their tax returns. To check this, we compare multiples on 
investments that are larger than the median with multiples on investments that are smaller than 
the median. T-tests for both base multiples and annual multiples find no statistical significance.  
The results show no evidence of bias. 
Summary  
  What then, does the evidence say regarding bias in the AIPP data? Based on the high 
percentage of investments that resulted in an IPO, we conclude that the data may contain some 
biases that inflate the reported performance of the angel groups that participated in the AIPP. The 
IPO comparison is not particularly apt, though, and the disparity in IPO rates in the AIPP dataset 
is substantially increased by one deal that attracted 13 individual angel investments. In addition, 
the evidence of bias is hardly overwhelming. First, the fraction of profitable sales is almost 
exactly the same as Band of Angels. Second, failure rates are substantially higher than the 
Brobeck data in Goldfarb et al. (2009), tilting the evidence of bias the other way. Third, implied 
internal rates of return and return multiples -- which are, after all, the fundamental input to our 
estimation procedure -- are comparable to figures from other sources, especially on a value-46 
 
weighted basis. Finally, the data survive several checks designed to detect bias. The percentage 
of follow-on investments in the AIPP data, which are correlated with higher returns at least on 
venture deals, is comparable to figures that other researchers report. Multiples from deals that are 
larger than the median do not differ statistically from those that are smaller than the median, and 
although some tests using the number of coinvestors support the claim that base multiples are 
biased high, there is no evidence of bias in annual multiples. The reason that base multiples 
without coinvestors are higher than deals with coinvestors is that deals with coinvestors tend to 
be shorter.  The correlation coefficient between the number of coinvestors and project duration is 
-0.24, with a p-value of 0.004. 
  Even if the AIPP data are free of bias, this does not mean that they are representative of 
angel investments in general. This is because the angel groups which participated in the study are 
not a random sample of all angel investors. Aside from the advantages that members of groups 
enjoy, the types of investments differ. For example, Shane (2009) reports that many angel 
investments are debt, whereas all of the deals in the AIPP are equity. Angel investors who are 
members of groups tend to fare much better than those who are not. 47 
 
Appendix II:  Data 
Calculations of present values of the first two follow-on investments: 
Because the AIPP data contain only the year of a cash flow, we assume that the cash flow 
occurs at midyear and therefore treat a year as covering the period from July 1 - June 30. We use 
end-of-month quotes from CRSP. This means that we use monthly 30-day (approximately) bill 
rates from the previous months (June 30 - May 31). For example, if the initial investment is 
made in year 2000 and the project exits in year 2001 then we use Treasury bill rates from June 
30, 2000 - May 31, 2001. We adjust these rates for the actual number of days in the month and 
sum the monthly rates over the period from the initial investment through the year of the follow-
on investment (or through the project’s exit) to compute the continuously compounded interest 
factor for the entire period. 
If the initial investment year is the same as the exit year then we use rates from the 
middle of the year (March 31 - August 31), covering the period from April 1 - September 
30. This also applies for later cash flows. For example, if the initial investment year is 2000 and 
the follow-on investment is also year 2000 then we use rates from March 31 - August 31. 
Calculation of present values of follow-on investments after the first two: 
The AIPP does not report the year of follow-on investments after the first two. Instead, 
the AIPP sums all remaining follow-on investments and reports this as a single number. The year 
is not reported. This occurs eight times in the 588 observations and seven times in the 419 exited 
investments. We assume that these follow-on investments occur midway between the second 
follow-on investment and the exit year. In one of these eight cases the exit year is not reported 
and in another the project has not yet exited. To handle these two cases we first calculate the 48 
 
average time between the second follow-on investment and the exit. This is about 2.5 years. We 
therefore add 2.5 years to the second follow-on investment in these two cases to obtain an 
estimate of the year of these follow-on investments. 
Calculation of present values of midcash payments: 
The AIPP does not report the year of midcash payments. We assume that midcash 
payments occur halfway between the beginning and end of the investment. 
 